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be informed of the nature of the charges against him should be
satisfied by such subtle implications in an indictment. Little
more justification for the state's refusal to grant defendant a bill
of particulars as to the intended forcible felony can be found in
the court's suggestion that this portion of the information could
be disregarded as surplusage, since the charge that he intended
to commit theft was sufficient. The accused was charged and
tried under an information charging dual intents and was refused
particulars as to one of them. If the fact that an information is
valid means that the defendant's right to a bill of particulars
has been satisfied, then the bill of particulars serves no useful
purpose in Louisiana criminal procedure.
Maynard E. Cush

FEDERAL PRACTICE-JURISDICTION-LOUISIANA

STATUTE,

WATERCRAFT

LA. R.S. 13:3479 (1950)

Plaintiff, widow of a Louisiana resident killed while working
as a ship repairman on a British steamer docked in New Orleans,
brought suit in federal district court 1 under article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code 2 to recover damages for his alleged wrongful death. Service of process was made pursuant to the Louisiana Watercraft Statute, La. R.S. 13:3479, providing, in substance,
for service of process on the Secretary of State in actions against
nonresidents growing out of any accident arising from the nonresident's operation, navigation, or maintenance of watercraft in
1. The modes of service of process in federal courts are provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Following is the pertinent provision of
Rule 4:
"(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making the service
with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:

"(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3)
of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United
States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the
service is made for the service of summons or other like process upon any
such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
that State." (Emphasis added.) FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
2. It is not within the limited scope of this note to consider the constitutionality of LA. R.S. 13:3479 (1950) as applied to a case arising under the
Jones Act, 38 STAT. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952), instead of
Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
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the state.3 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and, in
the alternative, to quash the summons, on the grounds that the
statute was unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the interstate and foreign commerce
clause, and the admiralty clause of the United States Constitution. The court denied the motions and held the state's right
and duty to provide protection for persons and property on its
navigable waters are no less important than its right and duty
to provide like protection for persons on its highways. Tardiff v.
Bank Line, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1954).
State statutes providing for the exercise of jurisdiction in
actions for personal judgments against nonresident defendants
must meet the requirements of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court
said that one of these requirements is service of process on the
defendant within the state.4 In subsequent cases, exceptions to
5
this requirement have been made in special situations. For
3. The text of the statute is as follows: "The operation, navigation or
maintenance by a non-resident or non-residents of a boat, ship, barge or
other water craft in the state, either in person or through others, and the
acceptance thereby by such non-resident or non-residents of the protection
of the laws of the state for such water craft, or the operation, navigation
or maintenance by a non-resident or non-residents of a boat, ship, barge or
other water craft in the state, either in person or through others, other
than under the laws of the state, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by each such non-resident of the Secretary of State or his successor
in office, to be the true and lawful attorney of each such non-resident for
service of process, upon whom may be served all lawful process in any suit,
action or proceeding against such non-resident or non-residents growing out
of any accident or collision in which such non-resident or non-residents
may be involved while, either in person or through others, operating, navigating or maintaining a boat, ship, barge or other water craft in the state;
and such acceptance or such operating, navigating or maintaining in the
state of such water craft shall be a signification of each such non-resident's
agreement that any such process against him which is so served shall be of
the same legal force and effect as if served on him personally."
LA. R.S. 13:3480 (1950) provides: "Service of citation in any case provided in R.S. 13:3479 shall be made by serving a copy of the petition and
citation on the Secretary of State, or his successor in office, and such service
shall be sufficient service upon any such non-resident: provided that notice
of such service, together with a copy of the petition and citation are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, or actually
delivered to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt, in case notice
is sent by registered mail, or affidavit of the party delivering the petition
and citation in case notice is made by actual delivery, is filed in the proceedings before judgment can be rendered against any such non-resident.
The court in which the action is pending may order such continuances as
may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend
the action."
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see also, e.g., Millar, Jurisdiction Over Absent Defendants: Two Chapters in American Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW RE-

viaw 321, 325 (1954).
5. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, § 73 ("Jurisdiction In Personam-

Persons Subject To") (1949).
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example, in Hess v. Pawloski, the Supreme Court held constitutional a Massachusetts statute providing that the operation of a
motor vehicle in that state by a nonresident motorist was equivalent to the appointment of the state registrar as the nonresident's
agent for the service of process in cases growing out of accidents
or collisions resulting from such operation. 6 The statute also
provided for giving notice of service and sending a copy of the
process to the defendant by registered mail. The Court based
the nonresident's amenability to suit in the state forum upon
the state's power to promote the health and safety of its citizens,
and held that the type of implied appointment with notice involved in that case did not offend due process of law.7 In actions
against foreign corporations, jurisdiction in personam was at
first restricted to the state which had chartered the corporation.8
It has now become well settled, however, that the corporation
may consent to the jurisdiction of another state's courts by appointing an agent there for the service of process. Even in the
absence of consent, statutes providing for service of process
within a state in actions arising out of the foreign corporation's
"doing business" within the state have been upheld on a theory
of implied consent. 9 The term "doing business" has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation, 0 resulting in an enlargement of state jurisdiction with an accompanying "erosion" of
the requirement of service of process on the corporate defendant
"doing business" within the state." In 1945, Chief Justice Stone,
6. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
7. The Supreme Court has since repudiated the idea that the jurisdiction

conferred by nonresident motorist statutes rests on the idea of consent.
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). The instant case
specifically recognizes this. "Even the assumption on which the consent is

predicated is fictitious. The right of the state to exclude nonresidents, as
such, from the highways is a myth, unsupported in our constitutional jurisprudence [citing cases]. No longer ago than last decision day, the Supreme
Court held [Castle v. Harper Freight Lines, Inc., 75 Sup. Ct. 191 (1954)] that
a motor line, guilty of repeated violations of state laws regulating vehicular

traffic, could not be excluded from the highways of the state whose laws it
insisted on offending." Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 945, 948
(E.D. La. 1954).
8. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839); HENDERSON,
THE POSITION OF FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW c.

5

(1928).
9. See, generally, International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 209, § 76 ("Jurisdiction Over Foreign

Corporations") (1949).
10. See the Court's summary of what "doing business" included in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
11. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (personal service of a copy of

the writ of attachment and of the inventory of the property on the agent of
the defendant corporation within the state); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899) (personal service on duly appointed agent
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in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,12 announced the Supreme Court's view that "due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'."13 The test formulated by the Court, however, as to the
jurisdictional requirements of due process is not expressed in
terms of "doing business" but looks instead to the "quality and
the nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
which it was the purpose of the due
administration of the laws
'14
process clause to insure.
The Court in the instant case drew an analogy between the
Louisiana Watercraft Statute and the nonresident motorist statute involved in Hess v. Pawloski. The nonresident motorist
statute involved in Hess v. Pawloski applied to cases "growing
out of any accident or collision in which said non-resident may
be involved while operating a motor vehicle" on the highways
of the state.' 5 The Louisiana Watercraft Statute applies to cases
"growing out of any accident or collision in which [the] nonresident or non-residents may be involved while, either in person
or through others, operating, navigating or maintaining a...
watercraft in the state."' 6 While the two statutes are based upon
the same idea, 7 they are different in two significant respects.
of foreign insurance company, in a suit on policies, where the company had
ceased to do business in the state prior to suit); Pennsylvania Lumbermen's
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1904) (personal service on director, a New York resident, of defendant Pennsylvania corporation, no agents
or officers being within the state); Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v.
Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909) (service on doctor sent to investigate settlement
of plaintiff's claim); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. of Texas v. Alexander,
227 U.S. 218 (1913) (joint freight agent in New York for Cotton Belt Route
and defendant connecting carrier, a Texas corporation; held defendant
"doing business" in New York; service on director of defendant, resident
of New York).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Id. at 316. "Those demands [of due process] may be met by such

contacts of the corporation with the State of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate
of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection." Id. at 317.
14. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945).

See, generally,

GOODRICH, HANDBOOK

OF

THE

CONFLICT OF

LAWS

§

76

(1949).

15. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927).

The Louisiana nonresident

motorist statute is LA. R.S. 13:3474-3475 (1950).
16. The statute is set forth in note 3 supra.
17. See, contra, Sarpy, Louisiana's Watercraft Statute and Federal Maritime Jurisdiction,29 TUL. L. REv. 111, 119 (1954).
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First, the nonresident motorist statute applies only to cases
arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, while the watercraft statute applies to cases arising out of the operation, navigation, or maintenance of a watercraft within the state. Thus
an automobile repairman's widow could not avail herself of the
former statute to prosecute an action for the wrongful death of
her husband arising out of the maintenance of a nonresident's
motor vehicle within the state; but a ship repairman's widow, as
in the instant case, can avail herself of the watercraft statute.
Second, the nonresident motorist statute was confined to activities more clearly dangerous than those, including maintenance,
covered by the watercraft statute. Thus the analogy drawn by
the Court between Hess v. Pawloski and the instant case is not
perfect. In drawing additional support for its decision from
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the court did not emphasize the language in that case concerning "the quality and nature
of activity" which justifies the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a corporate nonresident through the service of process on
an officer of the state. But it might have done so, for defendant's
steamer was in port, and the maintenance it was undergoing was
presumably essential or, at least, highly advantageous to its
continued operation. The death resulted directly from that
maintenance. In the course of its opinion the court pointed out
the inconvenience plaintiff would experience in having to seek
out defendant in Great Britain or having to wait, perhaps in
vain, 18 for the return of defendant's steamer in order to utilize
admiralty process. 9 From the viewpoint of the convenience to
either plaintiff or defendant resulting from the Louisiana Watercraft Statute, consideration should also be given to the availability of witnesses in Louisiana and the difficulty of proving
18. The court referred to the "peremptive period of one year" under Art.
2315, LA. CrVIL CODE of 1870, citing Mejia v. United States, 152 F.2d 686 (5th
Cir. 1945). This language is a reference to the opinions of certain Louisiana
cases which hold that unless an action for wrongful death is instituted
within a year of the death of the deceased as required by article 2315 of the
Civil Code, the action is "perempted." Under this view, article 2315 extends
the remedy only on condition that it be exercised within the year; and if
this condition is not complied with, plaintiff has no right of action. Matthews v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (1929); Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392 (La. App. 1940). But see Thompson v. Gallien, 127
F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1942) and cases therein cited; Note, 9 TUL. L. REV. 285

(1935).

-, A~r

19. As indicated in the statute cited in note 3 supra, Admiralty Rule 2
would preclude application of the subject statute in a suit before a federal
district court sitting in admiralty.
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Louisiana law to an English court. 20 Thus, on the basis of Hess v.
Pawloski and the more general considerations involved in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the court's conclusion that servthis one does
ice of process on the Secretary of State in cases like
21
not offend due process of law seems reasonable.
While there may be some disagreement as to whether or not
Pennoyer v. Neff has been abandoned, 22 it is certain that service
of process on the defendant within the state as a requirement of
due process no longer carries the same meaning that it did when
first announced. An expansion of state jurisdiction has been
recognized in the decisions, especially where the defendant has
been a foreign corporation. The International Shoe case increased this tendency. 23 The instant case sanctions the statutory
agent device of the Hess decision in an application of the International Shoe doctrine.
John S. White, Jr.

FRENCH CIVIL LAW-SALES-EARNEST

MONEY

Plaintiff deposited 200,000 francs with defendant during the
course of their negotiations for the sale of defendant's immovable
property. Upon failure to agree on the terms of the contract,
although a price of 1,000,000 francs had been agreed upon, defendant retained the deposit on the grounds that it constituted
earnest money within the meaning of Code Civil article 1590.1
Plaintiff instituted suit to recover the deposit. He contended that
article 1590 was inapplicable, because the payment had been
made to secure preference over another prospective buyer and
20. The burden of proving a difference between the law of England and
any foreign law is upon the party who asserts its existence. 13 HALSBURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND 614, § 685 (2d ed. 1934); see, e.g., Smith v. Gould, The
Prince George, [1842] 4 Moo. P.C.C. 21.
21. The defenses based on the interstate and foreign commerce clause,
and the admiralty clause of the Federal Constitution were rejected summarily on authority of Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Pueblo v. H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1947).
22. 23 U.S.L. WEEK 1101 (Jan. 11, 1955), announced the case with the following headline, "Pennoyer v. Neff Overruled, Federal District Court Holds."
23. See Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. OF
CHI. L. REV. 523 (1949).
1. Art. 2463, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870 is identical. It states: "But if the promise to sell has been made with the giving of earnest, each of the contracting
parties is at liberty to recede from the promise; to wit: he who has given
the earnest, by forfeiting it; and he who has received it, by returning the

double."

